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ABSTRACT
Maybe. Lemons and signalling models generally deal with different welfare problems, the former
with withdrawal of high quality sellers, and the latter with socially wasteful signals. Absent
signalling, with asymmetric information, high productivity workers may not be employed
where they are valued the most. If one’s productivity is known in alternative employment,




Akerlof (1970) analysed problems when price reflects
the average quality of sellers because buyers know
less than sellers about quality. If seller reservation
prices are positively related to quality, high-quality
sellers may exit the market. This is the lemons
problem in which asymmetric information results in
reduced welfare (versus costless information).
Spence (1974) considered how high-quality sellers
could signal their quality to buyers. Löfgren,
Persson, and Weibull (2002) argue that Spence’s
work shows how the lemons problem can be over-
come. However, Löfgren et al. acknowledge that, in
the general case examined by Spence, the alternative
to a signalling equilibrium is pooling where all are
paid a wage equal to their expected productivity.
There is no withdrawal of high-quality sellers from
the market. Welfare in the standard signalling model
is reduced because of the cost of signalling, and the
fact all signalling does is redistribute wealth.1 Thus,
lemons and signalling models are usually not con-
cerned with the same welfare problems.
The intention herein is to consider a labour mar-
ket with asymmetric information when there is a
potential lemons problem. First, I consider when a
lemons problem would occur. Second, I analyse
whether the lemons problem will be overcome via
signalling (albeit at some cost). Third, I examine
whether signalling increases social welfare.
Consider recent research on lemons markets.
Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) examine the impact on
welfare in a lemons market when trade may be
delayed. They suggest signalling via costly delay
may increase welfare. Delay must be imposed by a
regulator. Kim (2012) considers sellers’ incentives to
segment the market when buyers make a take-it-or-
leave-it offer. His model assumes costless commu-
nication by sellers before trade occurs. Voorneveld
and Weibull (2011) allow buyers to receive a noisy
signal of quality. They show there is a positive prob-
ability high-quality goods will trade even with unin-
formative signals. They assume signals are costless
and exogenous. Thus, none of this recent research
considers how a lemons result can be overcome via
costly signalling chosen by market participants.
II. A two-sector asymmetric information model
In Akerlof (1970), there is one market so goods or
services not sold are retained by sellers who value
them less than buyers. Suppose there are two sectors
in which individuals can work, S1 and S2, and the
value of all workers is greater in S1 than in S2. A
lemons problem then occurs if high-quality workers
are employed in S2 and not in S1. Since signalling is
costly, even if signalling overcomes the lemons pro-
blem, welfare will never be as high as it would be
with costless information.
There are many potential firms in either sector.
The focus is on perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(Gibbons 1992), in which individuals may move
first by signalling, and firms respond and compete
for individuals in Bertrand fashion, yielding zero
profit. Workers are either highs (H) or lows (L). In
the usual lemons model, a prospective seller’s value
for a good is positively related to the amount a buyer
who knew the good’s quality would pay. Thus, I
assume the alternative to primary sector employ-
ment, S1, is to receive compensation that is posi-
tively related to one’s productivity in the primary
sector. Productivity is assumed to be known in the
alternative sector, S2, which could represent self-
employment.
Productivity of an H in S1 = ax, a > 1, x > 0, and
productivity of an L in S1 = x. In S2, productivity of
an H = kax, and productivity of an L = kx, 0 < k < 1.
Let α equal the fraction of Hs in the population, with
α known to all.
Absent signalling, S1 firms cannot observe an
individual’s productivity, but learn average produc-
tivity. If both types are employed in S1, firms there
compete for workers and offer the pooling wage,
Wpool,1, equal to expected productivity, with
Wpool,1 = (αa + 1 − α)x. If no Hs are employed in
S1, firms ultimately learn who they get on average.
Then, in the usual lemons problem, the wage in S1
would equal x. Thus, Hs will apply to S2 if α is
relatively small so that
Wpool,1 < kax, or:
a <
ka 1
a 1 ; a
 (1)
Now ka > 1 in order for α < α*. If ka ≤ 1, α* ≤ 0, and
kax ≤ min Wpool,1 = x. Then Hs would go to S1. If
α < α*, Hs go to S2 and earn kax, and Ls go to S1
and earn x.
If α < α*, Ls go to sector S1 where they are valued
more than elsewhere, but, Hs go to S2 where they
are valued less than they are in S1. This is the classic
lemons problem where the highest quality sellers are
driven out of the market (S1) because the wage
there would reflect expected and not actual
productivity.
Let Hs signal to reveal their productivity. The
signal is denoted by y. The total cost of signalling
is y for Ls and y/g for Hs, with g > 1. Assume y does
not affect productivity.
In a signalling equilibrium, those who signal are
viewed as Hs and are offered ax in S1. Others are
revealed as Ls and are offered x in S1. For signalling
to occur, Hs must (weakly) prefer to be correctly
viewed, and Ls must not want to mimic them.
These conditions are:
ax y=g  x (2)
and
ax y < x (3)
so
a 1ð Þx < y  g a 1ð Þx (4)
Although any y that satisfies Equation 4 will
induce a signalling equilibrium, assuming Hs prefer
signalling to going to S2, competition by firms for
workers (Riley 1979; Cho and Kreps, 1987) in S1 will
result in y ≈ (a – 1)x ≡ yRiley. Then the net return to
an H from signalling is:




a g  1ð Þ þ 1½  (5)
and Equation 5 is clearly positive.
If signalling occurs, there are always values of y
for which Ls will not mimic Hs. However, Mailath,
Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1993) argue that
the more able will deviate from a pooling equili-
brium only when their payoff from signalling
exceeds that from pooling, given y = yRiley. Herein,
Hs would deviate from the equilibrium when they
are employed in S2 only if the signalling payoff in
Equation 5 exceeds kax, or if:
a g 1 kð Þ  1½  þ 1 > 0 (6)
A sufficient condition for Hs to prefer signalling to
going to S2 is if g(1 − k) ≥ 1. If signalling occurs, the
social return is that each H who moves to S1 from S2
adds output on net of ax(1 − k), which is also the
wage gain to an H. Also, the social cost of signalling
for an individual is a1ð Þxg . Therefore, signalling is
socially worthwhile if a(1 − k) ≥ a1ð Þg , which sim-
plifies to Equation 6.
The gain in output exceeds the cost of signalling
only if Equation 6 holds.2 Thus, individuals will
signal only when it increases welfare.
2If both types have the same productivity in the secondary sector, S2, it can be shown that signalling always occurs and increases welfare.
Consider the effects of a, g and k on the likelihood
signalling occurs. Denote the left-hand side of
Equation 6 by Z. For signalling to occur, Z > 0.
Note, for Hs to go to S2 absent signalling,
1
a
< k < 1:
Now lim
k!1a
Z = (g – 1)(a – 1) > 0, lim
k!1
Z = 1 − a < 0,
and @Z@k < 0. Signalling is less likely if the productivity
of all in S2 is large enough (dk > 0). With g > 1,
lim
g!1
Z = 1 – ak < 0, so, for a large enough marginal
cost of signalling for Hs (small enough g), signalling
will not occur. An increase in a has an ambiguous
effect on whether signalling occurs because it
increases the wage for an H with signalling in S1,
the wage for an H in S2, and yRiley.
Consider the likelihood of a lemons problem
occurring. The larger is α*, the more likely there is
a lemons problem. Using Equation 1, @α

@k > 0 and
@α
@a > 0. Since earnings (absent signalling) in the two
sectors determine whether a lemons problem occurs,
the marginal cost of signalling for the more able has
no effect on the likelihood a lemons problem occurs.
The higher are earnings in S2 (dk > 0), the more
likely there is a lemons problem.
Why does an increase in a increase the chance of
a lemon’s problem, since such an increase raises
productivity for Hs in S1 more than in S2? The
existence of a lemons problem depends on Wpool,1
and kax, that is, whether Hs prefer S2 or S1 absent
signalling. With @Wpool;1@a = αx, and
@ kaxð Þ
@a = kx, if
α < k, S2 earnings rise faster than S1 earnings for
Hs as a increases. Since α < α* for a lemons problem,
if α* < k, then α < k, and indeed α* < k.
In sum, a greater productivity for the more able
where they are more productive (da > 0) increases
the likelihood of a lemons problem, and has an
ambiguous effect on the likelihood of signalling
occurring. A greater productivity for all where they
are less productive (dk > 0), increases the likelihood
of a lemons problem, and decreases the likelihood
signalling will occur. A greater marginal cost of
signalling for the more able (dg < 0) has no effect
on the likelihood of a lemons problem and decreases
the likelihood of signalling occurring.
III. Summary
I find signalling may overcome the lemons problem,
and inefficient signalling does not occur: the output
gain from reallocating more able individuals to jobs
where they are more productive at least equals the
cost of signalling. My results add to the literature3
that considers a possible social value of signalling.
Even if the signal (say education) does not directly
add to individual productivity, signalling may
increase welfare by overcoming the lemons problem.
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